For years, the question of why Google dominates the web search landscape has intrigued economists, regulators, and ordinary internet users. Recently, a novel academic study attempted to shed light on this issue by directly investigating user preferences and the forces driving market share in web search. Conducted by researchers from Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, and MIT, the study, titled "Sources of Market Power in Web Search: Evidence from a Field Experiment," offered an innovative approach: it paid people to use Microsoft’s Bing instead of Google for two weeks. The results, besides sparking lively discussion among tech enthusiasts and legal experts, have real implications for ongoing antitrust cases and future competition in the digital marketplace.
The backdrop to this study is the ongoing debate about Google’s market power. In 2023, Google held a commanding share of the global desktop search engine market, generally estimated by StatCounter to hover around 85% or higher. Bing, despite years of investment and rebranding, typically accounts for 8-10% at best. The gap is striking, and various explanations have been offered—ranging from the superior quality of Google’s results, to the power of default settings on browsers, to more controversial claims that Google’s competitive position is fortified by anti-competitive practices.
This issue is also at the center of a high-profile U.S. Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit against Google. In fact, part of the government’s case centers on Google’s multibillion-dollar deals with manufacturers and browser makers to be the search default—an arrangement the DOJ claims limits rivals' ability to compete fairly.
The Stanford-led study directly addresses key questions underlying these legal and economic debates: How much of Google’s dominance is due to actual user preference? How much is inertia, sheer force of habit, or the cost and friction—psychological or practical—of switching? In other words, what would happen if people, with their usual routines disrupted and perhaps a small financial incentive, gave Bing a fair shot?
After the two-week period, participants were free to choose any search engine. A follow-up survey invited them to explain their reasoning. Key findings from the published report and the summary in Windows Central indicate:
This insight supports the DOJ’s case against Google: if being the default is so important that relatively modest friction keeps most users from changing, then Google’s lucrative deals to secure these default positions grant it a powerful advantage—one that competitors cannot easily overcome by merit alone.
That said, the limited increase in market share (1.1 percentage points) from simply forcing users to make a search engine choice suggests that not all users are locked in by friction alone. Many, when confronted with the option and empowered to choose, still go with Google.
This speaks to the potential gap between perception and reality. In the absence of direct comparison, many users default to the "safe" or "familiar" choice—Google. But when they actually use Bing for daily queries, the differences are less dramatic than expected, sometimes even favoring Microsoft’s engine in particular respects.
It’s important to note, however, that the initial shift does not equate to long-term market transformation. Survey responses and user-behavior studies often find that people will try alternatives but may ultimately revert to their original preferences over weeks or months. The stickiness of search habits—and the tendency for muscle memory to return—remains a powerful force.
But there is reason for caution. As Cornell economist Michael D. Smith notes (in related discussions but not directly on this study), economic models make strong assumptions about how people process new information and how sticky habits are in digital markets. Nevertheless, the simulation underscores the theory that the current search engine marketplace is not purely a meritocracy, and that competition is blunted by a combination of beliefs, laziness, and architecture (the way operating systems and browsers configure defaults).
The findings from the Bing experiment lend empirical weight to this position. If 22% of habitual Google users willingly switched after a paid trial, and many more stuck with whatever default was provided, then the power of being “first” or “automatic” cannot be overstated. Default bias, a well-studied phenomenon in behavioral economics, translates into billions of searches and, by extension, billions of dollars in advertising revenue.
Both Microsoft and Google are acutely aware of this power, which is why search engine deals are among the most lucrative arrangements in the tech industry.
The 22% retention rate after the trial suggests Microsoft could win hearts and minds, given a level playing field. However, getting users to even try Bing—outside of incentives, forced trials, or “browser hijacking”—remains the challenge. Google’s “search habit” is so deeply ingrained that only disruptive events (like a paid trial or an unexpected change of default) shake users out of their routine.
Moreover, Bing’s limited increase in market share—just over 1 percentage point, per the study—despite active choice, suggests that while the product may be “better than expected,” it does not (yet) offer enough of a leap to cause mass defection. Notably, the study stops short of detailing precisely where Bing is stronger than Google or vice versa; that’s the subject of other technical benchmarks and user surveys.
Should Chrome—Google’s window to billions of users—change hands, it could significantly shake up the search engine landscape. Default search deals would be thrown into question, and Microsoft, in particular, might see a rare opportunity to place Bing front and center for huge swaths of the internet population. However, this scenario is only one of many hypothetical outcomes, and any divestiture would be subject to complex legal and market analyses.
For regulators, it suggests that remedying monopolistic tendencies is not just about dismantling contracts or mandating technical changes. It may also require fundamental interventions that nudge or even require users to make real, informed choices when setting up devices or changing software.
From the user’s perspective, there is an argument for digital literacy—helping people understand what’s under the hood of their browsers, how search engines work, and why it might matter from the standpoint of privacy, data use, and search quality.
For Microsoft, the glass is half full: forced exposure to Bing does alter perceptions, and a meaningful minority of users come away impressed. Still, as the 22% retention figure shows, breaking entrenched habits and default bias is a herculean task—one not easily accomplished through marketing, technical tweaking, or even legal intervention alone.
For Google, the study is a reminder that its dominance rests on multiple pillars: quality, to be sure, but also convenience, default access, and—at least in part—market structures that reinforce the status quo. Whether these arrangements stand up to legal scrutiny, and whether they truly serve the public’s interest in competition and choice, are questions that remain unresolved but newly illuminated by this ambitious experiment.
In summary, search engine preference is less about outright product superiority and more a story of habits, incentives, and the quiet force of defaults. As regulators, consumers, and tech companies ponder the future of the web, this research provides both a note of optimism for competition and a cautionary tale about the persistence of digital routines. The path to a truly open search market may lie not only in better algorithms, but in smarter policy and more informed users.
Source: Windows Central Study paid people to use Bing instead of Google — here’s what happened
Motivating the Experiment: Market Power and User Choice
The backdrop to this study is the ongoing debate about Google’s market power. In 2023, Google held a commanding share of the global desktop search engine market, generally estimated by StatCounter to hover around 85% or higher. Bing, despite years of investment and rebranding, typically accounts for 8-10% at best. The gap is striking, and various explanations have been offered—ranging from the superior quality of Google’s results, to the power of default settings on browsers, to more controversial claims that Google’s competitive position is fortified by anti-competitive practices.This issue is also at the center of a high-profile U.S. Department of Justice antitrust lawsuit against Google. In fact, part of the government’s case centers on Google’s multibillion-dollar deals with manufacturers and browser makers to be the search default—an arrangement the DOJ claims limits rivals' ability to compete fairly.
The Stanford-led study directly addresses key questions underlying these legal and economic debates: How much of Google’s dominance is due to actual user preference? How much is inertia, sheer force of habit, or the cost and friction—psychological or practical—of switching? In other words, what would happen if people, with their usual routines disrupted and perhaps a small financial incentive, gave Bing a fair shot?
The Study: How Paying People to Use Bing Changed User Behavior
The experiment was carefully designed and notable for its scale. About 2,500 participants, all habitual Google users, were paid to use Bing as their default search engine for two weeks. The study then observed whether this brief, incentivized interlude altered their preferences or revealed overlooked strengths in Bing’s offering.After the two-week period, participants were free to choose any search engine. A follow-up survey invited them to explain their reasoning. Key findings from the published report and the summary in Windows Central indicate:
- About 22% of participants elected to stick with Bing after the experiment.
- When asked why, many of these users explained they found "Bing was better than I thought it would be."
- According to the study’s formal abstract, after trying Bing for two weeks, 33% of participants said they preferred to continue using it—indicating at least a temporary shift in perception or habit.
- When the default search engine on devices was set from Google to Bing, many users did not switch back—a result described as “consistent with persistent inattention.” In other words, inertia or lack of strong preferences appears to play a considerable role.
- Despite some positive shifts, making Google users actively choose their search engine only increased Bing’s market share by a modest 1.1 percentage points, suggesting that outright switching costs (in terms of time and effort) are limited.
Analyzing the Findings: What Drives Search Engine Loyalty?
The Power of Habit and Defaults
Perhaps the most provocative conclusion of the study is that many people continue to use Google in large part because it is the default option—whether on their smartphone, browser, or employer’s IT setup. When that default changes, only a minority immediately revert back, suggesting that for a substantial portion of the population, convenience and inertia shape their choices far more than product loyalty or technical superiority.This insight supports the DOJ’s case against Google: if being the default is so important that relatively modest friction keeps most users from changing, then Google’s lucrative deals to secure these default positions grant it a powerful advantage—one that competitors cannot easily overcome by merit alone.
That said, the limited increase in market share (1.1 percentage points) from simply forcing users to make a search engine choice suggests that not all users are locked in by friction alone. Many, when confronted with the option and empowered to choose, still go with Google.
Product Quality and User Perception
Another key finding is the extent to which exposure can shift opinions. For a third of the participants, trying Bing led to a preference (at least temporarily) over Google, or at least the willingness to continue using it. Some responses highlighted in the study and in Windows Central media coverage suggest that people were surprised by Bing’s capabilities, with many stating "Bing was better than I thought it would be."This speaks to the potential gap between perception and reality. In the absence of direct comparison, many users default to the "safe" or "familiar" choice—Google. But when they actually use Bing for daily queries, the differences are less dramatic than expected, sometimes even favoring Microsoft’s engine in particular respects.
It’s important to note, however, that the initial shift does not equate to long-term market transformation. Survey responses and user-behavior studies often find that people will try alternatives but may ultimately revert to their original preferences over weeks or months. The stickiness of search habits—and the tendency for muscle memory to return—remains a powerful force.
Economic Modeling: The Potential Impact of Eliminating "Frictions"
The authors also built economic models to gauge what might happen in the absence of all "frictions"—that is, if everyone tried Bing, if beliefs about the product reflected its actual quality, and if switching was effortless. According to these models, Bing could see its market share jump by as much as 15 percentage points—much higher than in the real-world experiment.But there is reason for caution. As Cornell economist Michael D. Smith notes (in related discussions but not directly on this study), economic models make strong assumptions about how people process new information and how sticky habits are in digital markets. Nevertheless, the simulation underscores the theory that the current search engine marketplace is not purely a meritocracy, and that competition is blunted by a combination of beliefs, laziness, and architecture (the way operating systems and browsers configure defaults).
Implications for Antitrust Law, Consumer Choice, and Microsoft’s Position
Ongoing DOJ Case and the “Default” Controversy
The timing of the study is significant, coming as the U.S. government intensifies its scrutiny of Google’s search dominance. The DOJ’s antitrust lawsuit, now working its way through the courts, alleges that Google has secured a stranglehold on search by making itself the default on nearly all mobile devices and browsers, sometimes through massive (reportedly upwards of $10 billion/year) payments to partners such as Apple. If it can be shown that these arrangements solidify Google’s dominance—not by producing a better product, but by stifling alternative paths—the argument for intervention becomes stronger.The findings from the Bing experiment lend empirical weight to this position. If 22% of habitual Google users willingly switched after a paid trial, and many more stuck with whatever default was provided, then the power of being “first” or “automatic” cannot be overstated. Default bias, a well-studied phenomenon in behavioral economics, translates into billions of searches and, by extension, billions of dollars in advertising revenue.
Both Microsoft and Google are acutely aware of this power, which is why search engine deals are among the most lucrative arrangements in the tech industry.
Microsoft’s Challenge: Changing Minds and Habits
For Microsoft, the study is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it dispels some of the “Bing stigma”—the idea, fairly or not, that Bing is hopelessly inferior to Google. On the other, it lays bare just how much of the market is locked down by default settings and sheer inertia.The 22% retention rate after the trial suggests Microsoft could win hearts and minds, given a level playing field. However, getting users to even try Bing—outside of incentives, forced trials, or “browser hijacking”—remains the challenge. Google’s “search habit” is so deeply ingrained that only disruptive events (like a paid trial or an unexpected change of default) shake users out of their routine.
Moreover, Bing’s limited increase in market share—just over 1 percentage point, per the study—despite active choice, suggests that while the product may be “better than expected,” it does not (yet) offer enough of a leap to cause mass defection. Notably, the study stops short of detailing precisely where Bing is stronger than Google or vice versa; that’s the subject of other technical benchmarks and user surveys.
The Chrome Factor and Strategic Rumors
Adding intrigue to the legal and business landscape, the report from Windows Central noted that if Google were forced to divest critical assets—namely, the Chrome browser—other technology firms, including OpenAI, might be interested buyers. This is consistent with speculative reporting from other tech outlets, though actual negotiations or regulatory outcomes remain uncertain as of 2024.Should Chrome—Google’s window to billions of users—change hands, it could significantly shake up the search engine landscape. Default search deals would be thrown into question, and Microsoft, in particular, might see a rare opportunity to place Bing front and center for huge swaths of the internet population. However, this scenario is only one of many hypothetical outcomes, and any divestiture would be subject to complex legal and market analyses.
Broader Market Effects: What Does "Choice" Really Mean Online?
A striking implication of the study is the complexity of “choice” in web search. From a consumer-rights perspective, the existence of a rival product (Bing) that’s competitive in functionality, but underused due to default bias and habit, challenges simple narratives about market functioning.For regulators, it suggests that remedying monopolistic tendencies is not just about dismantling contracts or mandating technical changes. It may also require fundamental interventions that nudge or even require users to make real, informed choices when setting up devices or changing software.
From the user’s perspective, there is an argument for digital literacy—helping people understand what’s under the hood of their browsers, how search engines work, and why it might matter from the standpoint of privacy, data use, and search quality.
Risks and Limitations: Experiment Design, Incentives, and Real-World Outcomes
While the study is innovative and robust by academic standards, its findings should be interpreted within context.- Sample Size and Representativeness: With 2,500 participants, the study is sizable for controlled research, but tiny compared to the hundreds of millions of daily search engine users. It’s possible that paid participants may have been more open to change or more tech-savvy than the general population.
- Short-Term vs. Long-Term Effects: The experiment tracked behavior over a two-week span. Longer-term dynamics—reverting to habits, growing to like (or dislike) a new service over months—remain unexplored.
- Incentives Skew Behavior: Being paid to try a product introduces a bias; some users might be temporarily more forgiving or more diligent in giving the new product a fair try.
- Unexplored Technical Differences: The study documented behavioral shifts rather than technical comparisons. For advanced users or those with specific requirements (e.g., research tools, integration with other software), the reasons for preferring one engine may be deeply technical or idiosyncratic, and not captured in generalized surveys.
The Verdict: "Bing was better than I thought it would be"—But Is That Enough?
As the legal battles continue and technology advances, the stakes in web search remain high. The Stanford-MIT-Penn study provides critical empirical insight into why people use the search engines they do, and how choices are shaped by more than just brand affinity or technical prowess.For Microsoft, the glass is half full: forced exposure to Bing does alter perceptions, and a meaningful minority of users come away impressed. Still, as the 22% retention figure shows, breaking entrenched habits and default bias is a herculean task—one not easily accomplished through marketing, technical tweaking, or even legal intervention alone.
For Google, the study is a reminder that its dominance rests on multiple pillars: quality, to be sure, but also convenience, default access, and—at least in part—market structures that reinforce the status quo. Whether these arrangements stand up to legal scrutiny, and whether they truly serve the public’s interest in competition and choice, are questions that remain unresolved but newly illuminated by this ambitious experiment.
In summary, search engine preference is less about outright product superiority and more a story of habits, incentives, and the quiet force of defaults. As regulators, consumers, and tech companies ponder the future of the web, this research provides both a note of optimism for competition and a cautionary tale about the persistence of digital routines. The path to a truly open search market may lie not only in better algorithms, but in smarter policy and more informed users.
Source: Windows Central Study paid people to use Bing instead of Google — here’s what happened
